Abstract: In the stable marriage problem, any instance admits the so-called man-optimal stable matching, in which every man is assigned the best possible partner. However, there are instances for which all men receive low-ranked partners even in the man-optimal stable matching. In this paper we consider the problem of improving the man-optimal stable matching by changing only one man's preference list. We show that the optimization variant and the decision variant of this problem can be solved in time O(n 3 ) and O(n 2 ), respectively, where n is the number of men (women) in an input. We further extend the problem so that we are allowed to change k men's preference lists. We show that the problem is W[1]-hard with respect to the parameter k and give O(n 2k+1 )-time and O(n k+1 )-time exact algorithms for the optimization and decision variants, respectively. Finally, we show that the problems become easy when k = n; we give O(n 2.5 log n)-time and O(n 2 )-time algorithms for the optimization and decision variants, respectively. 
Introduction
An instance of the stable marriage problem [1] consists of the same number n of men and women, and each person's preference list. In a preference list, each person ranks all the members of the opposite sex in a strict order. A matching is a set of n disjoint man-woman pairs in which each person appears exactly once. A blocking pair for a matching M is a man-woman pair each of whom prefers the other to his/her partner in M . A matching is stable if it contains no blocking pair.
It is known that there exists at least one stable matching in any instance, and one can be found by the Gale-Shapley algorithm (GS) in O(n 2 ) time [1, 2] . The stable matching found by GS is called the man-optimal stable matching that has an extreme property that every man is assigned the best possible partner among all the stable matchings. In applications for asymmetric settings, such as assigning residents to hospitals or students to schools, it is common to formulate the problem by setting residents or students to the men's side, so that those people can receive benefit. Nevertheless, there are instances for which all (or almost all) men are assigned low-ranked partners even in the man-optimal stable matching, (e.g., a worst case instance for GS given in Figure 1 , which originates from [2] ). For such instances, the merit of using the man-optimal mechanism cannot be sufficiently exploited. To overcome this drawback, we consider the problem of improving the man-optimal stable matching by allowing small changes in preference lists. In this paper we first allow only one man's preference list to be changed, and consider optimization and decision variants. In the optimization variant, we are asked to find a man and a way of changing his list that cause the maximum improvement. In the decision variant, we ask if we can obtain a positive improvement. For both problems, we impose a restriction that no man should be assigned a worse partner than the man-optimal partner in the original instance. We show that these problems can be solved in time O(n 3 ) and O(n 2 ), respectively. We then extend the problem so that we are allowed to change k men's preference lists. We show that the optimization variant is W[1]-hard with respect to the parameter k. We also give O(n 2k+1 )-time and O(n k+1 )-time exact algorithms for the optimization and decision variants, respectively. Finally, we show that the problems become easy when k = n, i.e., we are allowed to change the preference lists of any number of men. We give O(n 2.5 log n)-time and O(n 2 )-time algorithms for the optimization and decision variants, respectively. Our problem can also be viewed as an issue of coalition strategy by men. Knowing all the preference lists, men are trying to maximize their total profit by submitting falsified preference lists, while bounding the number of such liars and guaranteeing that no one becomes worse off. Results of this paper show the computational complexities of obtaining an optimal strategy depending on the number k of liars. Strategic issue in the stable marriage problem is an extensively studied topic (see [3] for example).
Preliminaries

Problem Definitions
Let I be an instance of the stable marriage problem. In this paper, we consider only complete preference lists with no ties. The rank of a woman w in man m's preference list, denoted r m (w), is one plus the number of women that precede w in m's list. The problem MAX MAN-OPT IMPROVE(k) (MMI(k) for short) is, given a stable marriage instance
Reduced Lists and Rotation Digraphs
In constructing algorithms and proving W [1] -hardness, we use reduced lists and rotation digraphs. w 1 ) , . . . , (m r−1 , w r−1 ) a rotation exposed in M . If we modify M by removing the pairs of rotation ρ and adding (m i , w i−1 mod r ) for each i, then the resulting matching is also stable [2] . In this case we say that the new matching is obtained by eliminating the rotation ρ from M . Note that by eliminating a rotation, every man in the rotation obtains a better partner, while every woman in the rotation obtains a worse partner. It is also known that M is the man-optimal stable matching of I if and only if there is no rotation exposed in M (or equivalently, D I,M has no directed cycle) [2] .
Changing One Man's Preference List
Optimization Variant
Let I be a given instance and M 0 be its man-optimal stable matching. Let us fix a man m whose preference list is to be changed. The following proposition, due to Huang [3] , is useful for our purpose. Recall that a preference list is ordered from left to right in increasing order of the rank. Example. We give an example of the execution of Algorithm 1 for instance I given in Figure 1 . The man-optimal stable matching M 0 is given in Figure 1 Apply GS to I m and find its man-optimal stable matching M m .
5: end for 6: Let m * be a man such that the score of M m * is minimum.
7: Output I m * .
Since GS runs in time O(n 2 ), line 1 and the body of the for loop can be executed in time O(n 2 ). Since there are n men, the overall time complexity of Algorithm 1 is O(n 3 ).
Decision Variant
Note that a direct application of Algorithm 1 solves
using a structural property of stable matchings. Let I be an input. From the discussion in Section 3.1, it suffices to consider the instance I m for each man m (see the description of Algorithm 1 for the definition of I m .) It is not hard to see that the man-optimal stable matching M 0 of I is also stable in I m for any m. Hence, if M 0 is not the man-optimal stable matching of I m for some m, then the man-optimal stable matching of I m is better than M 0 , so the answer is "yes"; otherwise, the answer is "no". Output "yes" and terminate. 
Changing k Men's Preference Lists
Hardness Result
In this section, we show W[1]-hardness of MMI(k). This hardness implies that MMI(k) probably does not admit an FPT algorithm with parameter k, i.e., an O(f (k) · p(n))-time algorithm where f is any function and p is a polynomial.
Theorem 4.1 MMI(k) with parameter k is W[1]-hard.
Proof. The Densest k Subgraph problem (DkS) [4] is the following problem. We are given a graph G and a positive integer k. The task is to find an induced subgraph of G with k vertices that contains the maximum number of edges. It is known that DkS is W[1]-hard with parameter k [5] . We give an FPT-reduction from DkS to MMI(k).
Given an instance (G, k 1 ) of DkS, we construct an instance (I, k 2 ) of MMI(k) as follows. First, we let k 2 = k 1 . Next, we construct I from G = (V, E). 
It is not hard to see that the man-optimal stable matching M 0 of I consists of pairs (m i , w i ) for
Note that if we ignore the "· · ·" part in the above preference lists, each man is matched with the last woman and each woman is matched with the first man in M 0 . Hence these are the woman-oriented reduced lists with respect to I and M 0 , i.e., RL I,M 0 .
Clearly, the reduction can be performed in time polynomial in |G|. To complete the proof, we show that G has an induced subgraph with k 1 vertices and at least s edges if and only if there is a proper k 2 -neighborĨ of I such that M O(I) − M O I (Ĩ) ≥ 2s. Since k 1 = k 2 , in the following we use k to denote k 1 and k 2 just for simplicity. First, suppose that G has an induced subgraph with k vertices and at least s edges, and let S(⊆ V ) be the set of those k vertices. Then, for each v i ∈ S, we modify m i 's preference list by moving his man-optimal partner w i to the top of the list, and letĨ be the resulting instance. We will show that, by doing this, m i,j and m ′ i,j 's scores in the man-optimal stable matching of I are decreased by one respectively, if v i , v j ∈ S and (v i , v j ) ∈ E. Since there are at least s such edges, the score is decreased by at least 2s in total.
Recall that 
Optimization Variant
From the discussion in Section 3.1, it seems that it would suffice to choose k men whose preference lists are to be modified, and move their man-optimal partners to the top of their respective preference lists. If this is true, we obtain an O(n k+2 )-time algorithm since there are O(n k ) combinations of selecting k men and for each of them, we run GS whose time complexity is O(n 2 ). However, the following example ( Figure 3) shows that this is not true. Nevertheless, the following lemma allows the search space to be bounded. By the definition of the problem, each man is matched in M opt to the woman M 0 (m) or a woman preceding M 0 (m). Hence by Lemma 4.2, if we fix the set of ℓ men whose preference lists are to be modified, it suffices to bring, for each selected man m, M 0 (m) or a woman preceding M 0 (m) to the top. Furthermore, we know that there is no stable matching for I opt in which every man in S is matched to a woman strictly better than his man-optimal partner in M 0 [2] . Hence for at least one man m * in S,
Putting these observations together, we have the following Algorithm 3. Let X be the set of men in a given instance.
Note that the operation of line 6 includes the case of leaving m i 's preference list unchanged. Therefore at least one execution of Algorithm 3, i.e., an execution for which m * in the above discussion is selected in line 2 as m and the rest of the ℓ − 1 men in S are selected in line 4, createsĨ in Lemma 4.2 and hence finds an optimal solution. The overall running time of Algorithm 3 is O(n 2 + n · Move w i to the top of m i 's preference list.
7:
end for 8:
Apply GS to the current instance and find its man-optimal stable matching.
9:
end for 10: end for 11: Output the instance that minimizes the man-optimal score. We can reduce the search space significantly using the following idea. Suppose that input I is a "yes"-instance of PMI(k), and let I opt be its optimal solution (when I is viewed as an MMI(k) instance). Let S (|S| ≤ k) be the set of men whose preference lists are modified in I opt . From the discussion in 
Decision Variant
O(n 2 + k ∑ i=1 ( ( n i ) (in + n))) = O( k ∑ i=1 n! (n − i)!i! · in) = O( k ∑ i=1 ( ( n − 1 i − 1 ) n 2 )) = O(n k+1 ). Theorem 4.4 PMI(k) can be solved in O(n k+1 ) time.
Changing n Men's Preference Lists
In this section, we show that MMI(k) and PMI(k) become easy if we are allowed to change any number of men's preference lists. We first consider the optimization variant. Consider an instance I and its man-optimal stable matching M We can obtain M * by finding a minimum cost perfect matching in G, which can be done in O(n 2.5 log n) time [6, 7] .
Since finding M 0 and constructing RL I,M 0 can be done in O(n 2 ) time, the overall time complexity is O(n 2.5 log n).
Theorem 5.1 MMI(n) can be solved in O(n 2.5 log n) time.
As for the decision variant, we do not need to find a minimum cost perfect matching but it suffices to check if M 0 can be Pareto improved. We can do this by constructing the digraph G = (V, A) , where each vertex of G corresponds to a woman in a given instance I. For each man m, we include an arc from M 0 (m) to each woman preceding M 0 (m) in m's preference list. It is not hard to see that M 0 can be Pareto improved if and only if G contains a directed cycle. As mentioned in the analysis of the time complexity of Algorithm 2 in Section 3.2, we can check whether G contains a directed cycle or not by a topological sorting algorithm in time linear in the size of G. Since the size of G is O(n 2 ), it is not hard to see that the overall time complexity is O(n 2 ).
Theorem 5.2 PMI(n) can be solved in O(n 2 ) time.
Conclusions
In this paper we considered the problem of changing at most k men's preference lists to improve man-optimal stable matchings. We have proved that the problem is W[1]-hard with the parameter k. We also presented O(n 2k+1 )-time and O(n k+1 )-time exact algorithms for the optimization and decision variants, respectively. Finally, we have presented O(n 2.5 log n)-time and O(n 2 )-time algorithms for the optimization and decision variants, respectively, when k = n. Since the problem is important when k is small, it is interesting future work to reduce the time complexity of MMI(1) from O(n 3 ) to o(n 3 ).
Another future work is to determine whether PMI(k) is NP-complete or not.
